| A Crash Course in Nontraditional Case Structure in LD Debate | | Print | |
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Kelly Wright is a senior at Starr's Mill High School in Atlanta, GA. This article was written in conjunction with the CDE Scholar's Program. As Lincoln-Douglas debate advances into a new era, complete with kritiks, appeals to emotion, and counter-plans, debaters find themselves advancing into new and unique methods of communication. At the heart of this revolution is one of debate’s most effective toolboxes, more commonly known as the debate case. Straying away from the traditional value, criterion, and contention structure, debaters have learned to manipulate their cases in an attempt to achieve more specific goals, be it one of pulling at the heartstrings of judges or making effective statements on the nature of society. These intrepid moves have invoked a large gamut of judge reaction, ranging in everything from utter disgust to revelation. But regardless of judge reaction, many debaters find themselves completely unprepared to handle such cases. Oftentimes, debaters find themselves staring at a flow during those short three minutes of prep, asking things such as “Where did my opponent’s value go? Are there any actual arguments here?” Fumbling notes in the following speech, the proceed to address their opponent’s case, often missing entire arguments. It isn’t enough for a debater to rely on his or her judge to sign the ballot in his or her favor because of the opponent’s case structure. Rather, it is the debater herself that is responsible for being able to identify such “non-traditional” LD cases and respond accordingly. The goal of this essay is to identify and familiarize debaters on the modern circuit with these new and unique methods of communication in Lincoln-Douglas, with particular focus on the two of the most controversial case establishments in LD: the narrative and the kritik. I. The Narrative As a general conception, a narration is, according to The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, “The recounting of an event or series of events or the act of telling a story” (“narrative” 1). Employed in the realm of Lincoln Douglas debate, the narrative serves as a unique and non-traditional approach to communication and argumentation. J.M. Bartanen comments on the status of narration in the debate world, stating that, “Perceived as narrators, debaters present competing stories relevant to the topic area. They recount ideas of others and events of the past and try to account for those ideas and events. Interwoven, necessarily, are their own experiences and perceptions” (McDonald and Jarman 1)While approached as an artistic and imaginative way to address current issues and policy decisions, narratives, like many other non-traditional styles, have received mixed reviews throughout the debate community, and, subsequently contain both beneficial and harmful strategic approaches. The most common criticism of a narrative style debate case appears in Robert H. Gass’s article, The Narrative Perspective in Academic Debate: A Critique. In this commentary, Gass outlines several inherent flaws within this somewhat new style of debate, arguing specifically that “the narrative paradigm lacks the precision needed for academic debate” (McDonald and Jarman 2). The main argument rests in the concept that Lincoln-Douglas debaters should, instead of simply explaining behavior, debaters have an academic obligation to regulate behavior. This implies that, within debate rounds, competitors should set standards and guidelines as to how issues should be resolved, rationally answering questions resolving theory and the overall conception of decision-making. The narrative fails to acknowledge this duty in academic debate and instead replaces rationality with simple appeals to emotion. The second significant argument regarding narration regards the problem of judge intervention. In their analysis of Gass’ position, Kelly McDonald and Jeffrey W. Jarman state that “He believes that the problem is that the narrative paradigm utilizes the judge as the referent for the quality of argument, therefore inviting judge intervention. Within the narrative paradigm, arguments are right or wrong based upon particular judges” (McDonald and Jarman 2). This has an impact on both debaters: First, it becomes difficult for those arguing with narrations because the impact of his or her arguments rest solely on the judge’s perception of life and is therefore not objective based upon his or her argumentation and logic. Second, the debater arguing against the narrative must make it implicitly evident to the judge that the argument is not grounded in logical precepts. The opposing debater must remind the judge to take a step back from the situation allow for analysis based upon applied principles, or those which attempt to regulate human action. Advocates of narration in academic debate, on the other hand argue more commonly that “a story has the power to convey information and humanize a situation which might be unavailable in other formats” (McDonald and Jarman 2). It has the ability to seal the gaping holes that debaters tend to experience between academics and the real world. Narrative cases have a tendency to bring judge and debater closer together, as opposed to the classic “competitor/observer” status. Holligan, Riley, and Baaske give two compelling and summarizing arguments presented by the advocates of narrative debate. “First, such a perspective would make our activity seem infinitely more understandable to out colleagues, administrators, and the general community, people who are themselves storytellers. As a result, it would likely make it much easier to “sell” the merits of debate and engender a climate of greater support for academic debate.” Next, they state that “teaching debaters to engage in storytelling might be of immense help in preparing them for arguing in “real world” contexts” (332). Understanding the narrative case structure as an attempt to create a communicatory and compelling argument should help debaters in developing argumentation against such cases. First, debaters must acknowledge that, hidden within each narrative case, is the generic structure that many in Lincoln-Douglas debate are used to. Identify and isolate the overarching theme of the case, or what the story is trying to achieve; apply this as the value. Look for individual arguments and clarify and solidify a structure in cross-examination. Second, debaters must be aware that they ought to be able to reach the same level of communication strived for in their opponent’s narrative in order to attain his or her opponent’s strength (communication), while also achieving what the opponent lacks, or a concise structure with clear logical arguments. Originating in policy debate, the adoption of the kritik in Lincoln-Douglas debate has been widespread and, quite unmistakably, met with much skepticism. At its base, Jason Baldwin defines a kritik in his analysis of the kritik structure in LD. “A kritik makes an argument concluding that the resolution is false, attacks the logical validity of an affirmative constructive argument, attacks the truth of a premise of an affirmative constructive argument, or attacks the relevance of the conclusion of an affirmative constructive argument” (Baldwin 1). William Bennett states that “the kritik argues that ideas which will never be implemented are not as important as ‘real’ ideas and impacts” and “that there is a harm created by the assumption created or used by the other side“(Bennett 1). Much controversy throughout the Lincoln-Douglas debate community is deeply rooted within the introduction of the kritik into this “philosophical” style of debating. Yet, like the narrative, it does not come without its advocates and mixed views of its strategic advantages. Most pertinent within argumentation surrounding kritiks is the question of whether or not the introduction of critical theory creates the clash called for in academic debate. Baldwin comments that “My best guess it that more often than not, the language of kritik serves an expressive function, to indicate the speakers enthusiasm or contempt for a particular argument. If this is right, the kritik label reveals more about the psychology of the person applying it that it does about the argument to which it is applied. And this, in turn, means that no one single all-purpose reaction is appropriate to arguments labeled kritiks, whether that reaction be admiration, credulity, fear, scorn, or outrage” (Baldwin 2). Baldwin’s argument is also that of judge intervention, similar to concerns regarding narrative cases. His most compelling advice regarding kritiks, however, is that “Whatever else, they are, kritiks are arguments, and they can be criticized in the same way other arguments can be criticized: as invalid, unsound, or irrelevant” (Baldwin 2). According to critical theory against kritiks, several approaches to critical argumentation include, above all, relevance to the debate at hand. More often than not, kritiks tend to skirt the issue at hand, providing no evident link to resolutional argumentation. Pat Gehrke explains this inconsistency by commenting that, “Too often debaters will formulate a non-unique disadvantage or an incomplete criticism of the other team’s value or truth assumptions and attach the words ‘This is a critique! It is an A Priori voting issue!’ to the end with little, or no explanation” (Gehrke 2). Demand resolutional analysis and consistent links to impacts in cross-examination, and emphasize these issues throughout the round. Oftentimes, while these approaches to Lincoln-Douglas debate may seem intimidating, each has specific qualities unique to Lincoln-Douglas subtly advanced within their cases. Debaters must find an approach to these contemporary styles that allows them to debate in the way that they are most comfortable. Establish grounds in cross examination that allow you to organize the debate based upon your standards. Works Cited |
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